Preparing for the Next War: The Industrial Mobilization Plans & Their Impact on World War II
World War I was one of the most destructive conflicts in human history, claiming the lives of over 8.5 million troops, with 21 million wounded, and over 7.5 million imprisoned or captured.[1] This conflict saw drastic changes in technology, munitions, and tactics, which increased the casualty count.
The war ended with an Armistice, which famously took effect at the 11th minute of the 11th hour of the 11th month of 1918.[2] Following the war, the United States began analyzing its part in it and debating preparation for a future war.
Congress sought to remedy what many considered a lack of preparation for America’s involvement in World War I, starting with the passage of the National Defense Act of 1920. This act included plans for procurement for a future war, noting the responsibility of the Assistant Secretary of War for the “…supervision of the procurement of all military supplies and other business of the War Department pertaining thereto and the assurance of adequate provision for the materiel and industrial organizations essential to war-time needs.”[3]
Through the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War (OASW), Army planners began planning for a future war and published Industrial Mobilization Plans (IMPs) in 1931, 1933, 1936, and 1939.
Although historians have done significant research on mobilization during the interwar period, the historiography on the Industrial Mobilization Plans themselves and the impact of those plans is lacking.
Early post-war historians published official histories of the role of industry during World War II with brief mention of the IMPs, but these were laudatory in nature, with little critical analysis. Titles include R. Elberton Smith’s The Army and Economic Mobilization (Washington, DC, 1957) and Harold W. Thatcher’s Planning for Industrial Mobilization, 1920-1940.
Early academic histories such as Donald M. Nelson’s Arsenal of Democracy: The Story of American War Production (New York, 1946) and Robert M. Patterson’s Arming the Nation for War: Mobilization, Supply, and the American War Effort in World War II (Knoxville, TN, 2014) (published posthumously) provide limited analysis of the plans, but nothing approaching a critical review of the Industrial Mobilization Plans.
Another important contribution to the historiography on1945,trial Mobilization Plans is the work of Paul A.C. Koistinen, an economic historian whose dissertation, “The Hammer and the Sword: Labor, the Military, and Industrial Mobilization, 1920-1945,” focused on the role of organized labor in the development of the Industrial Mobilization Plans.
There is an opportunity for historians to conduct further research into the Industrial Mobilization Plans themselves, and the impact these plans had on the conduct of World War II. Specifically, the author of this blog proposes to explore the following research questions:
What was the purpose of the Industrial Mobilization Plans? What impact did the Industrial Mobilization Plans have on US preparation for World War II? How and why did the Industrial Mobilization Plans change over time? How did the Industrial Mobilization Plans impact the outcome of World War II? Finally, what lessons can military and political leaders today garner from the Industrial Mobilization Plans of the 1930s?
The author first began thinking about the Organic Industrial Base in 2022, during the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine conflict. At this time, the author served at United States Army Europe and Africa in the G-4 (Logistics) directorate, Mobility Operations Division (MOD). As the United States contributed munitions, materiel and equipment to our Ukrainian partners, MOD’s mission involved managing and tracking its distribution from Western Europe into Ukraine. During the early days of the conflict, it became apparent that the US defense industry could not adequately meet Ukraine’s demand for munitions. This got the author to thinking about the last time American industry was able to successfully mobilize its industry (World War II, being the answer) and what factors enabled that success. Thus, the genesis of this research project.
As a career Logistics officer in the US Army, the author has a unique perspective on the US Organic Industrial Base. Currently, he serves as a Division Chief at Defense Logistics Agency, responsible for managing the flow of repair parts to several key US Army depots and industrial programs. Additionally, the author’s academic background includes a BA in History, MA in Transportation & Logistics Management, and MA in Military History (Norwich University, 2020), which provides a unique perspective on these research questions.
To explore the impact of the Industrial Mobilization Plans on the conduct of World War II, the author proposes to examine the political, economic, and military contexts of the IMPs. Research into this topic will utilize a typical documentary approach, analyzing the four IMPs themselves, the records of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War, records of the Army Navy Board, as well as records from the Army War College and Army Industrial College (now the National Defense University).
Assessing the impact of the IMPs will focus on comparing the components of the plan and how they changed throughout time against how those components were (or were not) implemented by the United States during World War II. Specifically, the original plans focused on raw materials, prioritization, organization, training, labor, and transportation aspects of mobilizing for a future war. The study will approach an assessment of the plan’s impact by examining those components in the initial plans and how the military implemented them, framing these components in a political, economic, and military context.
Following the assessment, the study aims to
draw conclusions which would support lessons which current military and
political leaders can apply to industrial mobilization in the present day. In so doing, the author will attempt to add
something of value to this important topic in military history.
[1] “Killed, wounded, and
missing” Brittanica Online. https://www.britannica.com/event/Treaty-of-Versailles-1919,
accessed 23 August 2025.
[2]“Armistice on the Western
Front.” The National World War I Museum and Memorial. https://www.theworldwar.org/learn/about-wwi/armistice,
accessed 23 August 2025.
[3] U.S. Congress. National Defense Act of 1920. Public Law 66-242. 66th Congress, 2nd Session. June 4,1920. Accessed 22JUL25 from https://congressional.proquest.com/congressional/docview/t41.d42.66_pl_242?accountid=12085, 764-765.
Photo: B-24 Liberator Assembly Line at Ford Willow Run Bomb Plant, 1944, accessed 24AUG25 from https://www.thehenryford.org/artifact/229817/

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